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The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) Commercial Crew Program (CCP) has been
chartered to facilitate the development of a United States
(U.S.) commercial crew space transportation capability
with the goal of achieving safe, reliable, and cost effective
access to and from low Earth orbit (LEO) and the
International Space Station (ISS) as soon as possible.
Once the capability is matured and is available to the
Government and other customers, NASA expects to
purchase commercial services to meet its ISS crew
rotation and emergency return objectives.
The primary role of the CCP is to enable and ensure safe
human spaceflight and processes for the next generation
of earth orbital space systems. The architecture of the
Program delineates the process for investment
performance in safe orbital systems, Crew Transportation
System (CTS) certification, and CTS Flight Readiness. A
series of six technical documents build up the architecture
to address the top-level CTS requirements and standards.
They include Design Reference Missions, with the near-
term focus on ISS crew services, Certification and Service
Requirements, Technical Management Processes, and
Technical and Operations Standards Evaluation
Processes.
NASA's interest is not in a fiscal return on investment,
but rather in safe crew transportation capabilities and
technologies, as measured by the likelihood of an
eventual CTS certification. Thus, as a significant
investor, NASA requires a partnership which involves
enabling, monitoring, and understanding the Commercial
Partner's processes, decisions, trades, and risk evaluations
affecting the CTS design, production, and operation. The
end-to-end CTSs are expected to be owned, managed, and
operated by the Commercial Partner. The CCP will
manage the national investment by maintaining insight
into areas that could affect Investment Performance and
future CTS certification.
A Government insight/oversight model can impact the
Commercial Partner's cost; therefore, CCP architecture
will not use the traditional human spaceflight day-to-day
in-depth model. Rather, CCP oversight is focused only
on base-lining CTS safety requirements and standards,
approving Commercial Partner certification plans, and
approving the completion of milestones. CCP insight is
modeled as a cooperative partnership to provide NASA
the ability to gain a working-level understanding of the
Commercial Partner's designs, trades, safety risks,
processes, and implementation while assisting the
Commercial Partner with technical expertise and issue
resolution. The CCP has established CCP Partner
Integration Teams to bring working-level understanding
and value through strong technical relationships with
Commercial Partner counterparts.
Managing risk is the foundation of any architecture. To
that end, the CCP empowers the Commercial Partner to
defme, own, and manage their risk management process.
This process will enable the Commercial Partner to
identify, mitigate or resolve, and communicate risks
throughout all phases of the life-cycle of the project.
NASA will have insight into the Commercial Partner's
risk management process and resultant data. Significant
risks will be elevated within the CCP by the Partner
Integration Team, paying particular attention to those
risks that pose a threat to CTS certification and safety
performance. The CCP will also own and manage a
NASA risk management process to control Program
investment, certification, safety, and milestone risks. The
CCP and the Commercial Partner will jointly understand
and manage the risks associated with crew safety and
mission success.
NASA CCP's architecture is built on a foundation of
safety risk management through the use of focused insight
and oversight processes enabling safe human spaceflight
and processes for the next generation of orbital space
systems, including access to the ISS.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110023223 2019-08-30T18:03:37+00:00Z
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CCT -PlN-II00: Crew Transportation Plan 
Program summary of roles, responsibilities, and interfaces between the 
Commercial Crew Program and Commercial Partners in the developmentof 
a certified Crew Transportation System. 
CCT-ORM-III0: Crew Transportation System 
Design Reference Missions 
Summary of potential reference missions forthe Crew 
Transportation System. 
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CCT-REQ-1130: ISS Crew Transportation 
Certification andServices Requirements 
- --, 
CCT-PlN-1120: Crew Transportation 
Technical Management Processes 
Summary of technical management processes that support 
certification and expectations forevidence of compliance . 
SSP 50808: ISS to Commercial Orbital 
Transportation Services Inter/ace Requirements 
Requirements to transport NASA crew to the International Space Requirements to interface with the International Space Station. 
Station . 
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CCT-STO-1140: Crew Transportation Technical 
Standards and Design Evaluation Criteria 
Summary of expectations and criteria used in the evaluation of 
technical standards. 
-II 
CCT-STO-lls0: Crew Transportation 
Operations Standards 
Summary of expectations for minimum criteria and practices for 
operations. 
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CCT-PlN-II00: Crew Transportation Plan 
Program summary of roles, responsib ilit ies, and interfaces betwee n the 
Commercial Crew Program and Commercial Partners in the development of 
a certified Crew Transportation System. 
CCT-ORM-III0: Crew Transportation System 
Design Reference Missions 
Summary of potential reference missions forthe Crew 
Transportation System. 
CCT-PlN-1120: Crew Transportation 
Technical Management Processes 
Summary of technical management processes that support 
ce rtification and expectations for evide nce of compliance. 
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CCT-REQ-1130: ISS Crew Transportation 
Certification and Services Requirements 
Requirements totransport NASA crew to the International Space 
Station . 
SSP 50808: ISS to Commercial Orbital 
Transportation Services Interface Requirements 
Req u ire me nts to inte rface with the I nte rnationa I Space Station. 
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CCT -SID-1140: Crew Transportation Technical 
Standards and Design Evaluation Criteria 
Summaryof expectations and criteria used in the evaluation of 
technical standards. 
CCT-STO-1150: Crew Transportation 
Operations Standards 
Summary of expectations for minimum criteria and practices for 
operations. 
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Commercial Partner Derived total CTS System 
-Requirements 
-Specifications 
-Standards t-.:.~~~::'::";=u.:..l:~~=~ 
Commercial Partner Certification Plan 
(What, How and When) 
-End-to-end verification strategy defined 
-Verification matrix and methods identified 
-Verification sequence and schedules developed 
Related Products 
-Configuration (Designs, Processes, and Operations) 
-Test Plans, Procedures, and Results ~~WI)Ul.l!alJ;IIlJIJigb1,jaj~JlCI 
-Analytical Modeling, Results, and Reports 
-Inspections, Demonstration, and Results 
-Safety Review - Hazards, FMEA, etc. 
-Probabilistic Safety Products (LOC/LOM) 
Commercial Partner Certification Data Package 
-Summarizes certification effort 
-Provides assessments and recommendations 
-Identifies open issues or forward work 
Certification .., .... , ....... u . ... 
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• Hazard Analysis 
• FMEA 
• Development 
Test/Analysis 
• Flight Experience 
• Change Evaluations 
• Anomaly 
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-Certification Performance 
-Hazard Control Changes 
-Analytical Modeling , Results , and Reports 
-Safety Review - Hazards, FMEA, etc. 
-Probabilistic Safety Products (LOC/LOM) 
Commercial Partner Risk Management System 
-Identify 
-Evaluate 
-Commercial Partner Mitigation Plans 
-Communicate Risks to Commercial Partner Team 
-Identify 
-Evaluate 
-Mitigation Plans 
-Communicate and Manage Risks with Commercial Partner 
-Communicate Risks to Agency 
NASA Insight Level Risk Assessment 
-Evaluate significant Commercial Partner Risks 
-Evaluate Commercial Partner Mitigation Plans 
-Coordinate Safety Risks into the Commercial Partner's 
Risk Management System 
23 

